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SHORTER TICLES 
Suspension and the non-striking worker 
John Hughes* 
Section 128 of the Industrial Relations Act 1'973 allows an ,employer to suspend non-
striking workers whe~e work normally performed by them is not available because of a 
strike. This article considers the background to, and the case law arising r~om, such sus-
pensions and the limitations that have been established on the employers power to suspend 
such workers. 
Introduction: The Political Context 
Section 128 subsection 1 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1973, as amended, states that 
• 
Where there is a strike, and as a result of the strike any employer is unable to provide 
for any workers who are in his employment and not on strike work that is normally 
performed by them, the employer may suspend their employment until the strike is 
ended. 
The legal consequence of such suspension is set out in subsection 2 of section 128. 
Such a worker will not be entitled to .any remuneration during the period of suspension 
but, on the resumption of ·employment, the worker's service will be deemed to have been 
continuous for the purpose of any rights and benefits that are conditional upon such 
continuity. 
Section 128 owes its origin to the Industrial R~elations Bill 1972 into which it was intro-
duced, in the words of one commentator, ''in order to provide a legal basis and machinery 
for ~ already existing practice" of laying off workers in these circumstances (Hanse~, · 
1974, p. 318); the existence of the practice may explain the description of the original 
clause in the 1972 Bill by the then Minister of Labour as being simply one which "pro-
tects the superannuation and other rights of workers unfortunately caught up in a strike to 
which they ar·e not parties". (NZPD {1972) 381 p. 3478) While the Bill was before the 
Select Committee there was a change in government and the incoming Labour Government 
amended the clause providing for a right to suspend by requiring the employer to give at 
least one week's notice before such a suspension took effect. Following the 1975 election 
the requirement for notice was removed by section 3 of the Industrial Relations Amend-
ment Act 19 76 (No. 1 ). The Act also widened the defmition of what constituted "strike" 
action. (Woods, 1976; Reid, 1977; Szakats, 1977) One of the r~easons advanced for the 
failure of the existing suspension provision was what was then said to be a "narrow" defi-
nition of "strike". The aim of removing the minimum period of notice was ostensibly "to 
provide employers with a means of countering, amongst other things, a rolling stoppage 
situation, and to recognise that an employer should not be liable to pay the wages of non-
striking workers from the time work is unavailable". (NZPD (1976) 405 p. 1701) There 
appeared to be a further objective, this being to bring pressure to bear upon those whom 
the Government regarded as "militant elements" within unions from workers who had 
been suspended as a result of strike action. (NZPD (1976) 4()5 p. 1722) 
The weight given to this further objective may be assessed by considering the contem-
poraneous passage of the Social Security Amendment Act 1976, section 11 of which granted 
discretion to the Social Security Commission to postpone the commencement of an un-
employment benefit for a period not exceeding six weeks where, amongst other things, 
" [ t] he applicant has lost his employment by reason of a strike either by himself or by 
fellow members of his union at the same place of employment". Just as the statutory intra-
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duction of suspension was said to confirm existing industrial practice, so this provision wu 
said to reflect "the long-standing policy of successive Governments and . . . • •• ey 
doubts about legislative authority for this policy". (NZPD (1976) 406 p. 2571) It il 
tionable whether "the longstanding policy" referred to was ever applied strictly to workers 
unemployed as an indirect result of a dispute, but, as early as 1970, the 
Commission recommended to the Royal Commission on Social Security in New le•lattd 
that the law needed strengthening to give specific authority when detenninlng dle entitle-
ment to unemployment benefit of workers who lost their jobs through industrial action. 
(Social Security Department, 1970) The Royal Commission's view that this wu a "poHtical 
problem which ... cans for a political decision" and that the existing law wu &tu speclftc 
as the law needs to be, or can be" (Social Security in New Zealand (1974), p. 298}, never-
theless met with a "political decision" that the law should be amended and made more 
specific. The 1976 amendment went beyond the existing rationale of ensuring that benefit 
should not be made available to those who were responsible for their own UDeasployment. 
That rationale was arguably supported by the pre-existing disqualifications of "voluntary 
unemployment without good and sufficient reason" and aafailure without good and suffic.. 
ient reason to accept any offer of alternative employment", and tiUs much seemed to be 
accepted by the Royal Commission. The function of the amendment must therefore be 
looked for elsewhere and, given the timing employed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that the Government's aim could be summed up in the rhetorical question posed by Pro-
fessors Kahn-Freund and Hepple, "What is the denial of unen1ployment benefits ••• if It is 
not an indirect compulsion to return to work?". (Kahn-Freund and Hepple (1976}, p. 8) 
Despite the difficulties which might be inherent in the drafting of the amenclinent ( e.a. tbe 
failure to defme uplace of entployment") its passage provoked Httle oppolition aad the 
repeal of such provisions cannot be envisaged as a popular poHtical cause. 
The Case Law Under Section 128 
Before examining the approach taken to section 128 by the Arbitration Court twe 
general points may be made. The first is that, as presently drafted, the section the 
familiar spectre of the floodgates of litigation bein-g opened. This is no novel phenomenoa 
in New Zealand's industrial relations law as the events leading up to the 1978 Dunlop 
Report on the Freezing Industry indicate. In the case of section 128 the poteDtill for a 
"flood" of claims being brought before the court arises from the drafting of 3 
of that section, whereby where any worker is suspended '~e or any union 
him'' may appeal to the Arbitration Court against the suspension. Topther with IIGiioa 
11 7 subsection 3A, which gives workers the right to pursue a penooal piewnce Indi--
vidually in certain circumstances, the right of individual worken to appeal to the court 
under section 128 forms an exception to the general rule that individuals haw DO 1ocua 
standi under the Act. Where appeals have been lodged by unions under the sectioa, t1a1 
tendency has been to put forward a test case; however the court hu pointed out that aueh 
test cases do not determine the rights of those workers who were suapenclecl but -.. 
appeals have not been heard.1 Thus it appears desirable for the workers , to.._ 
individual cases. Such cases must, in order to reach a conclusion, be conaidered..,.....,-,r 
some involve more than 100 worken.3 The Arbitration Court hu not yet ...... 
to hear individual claims involving such numbers but if it wu so caUed upon tt. 
difficulties can easily be imagined. 
I See e.g. Olnterbury Rubber Workers IUW v Firestone Tire and Rubber Cof!IPtlny 
Ind. Ct. 53 and New Zealtlnd Federation of Wood Pulp etc, Workerr lnCD'fJOI'tlUd y Nn~ 
Products Ltd (1978) lnd Ct. 31. 
2 Jamieson J. in Whitehouse and Others v Ford Motor C.ornptlny of Nrw z_,,., l .td fi9Ttl 
Ct. 287. 
3 This was the position in the New Zealllnd Forert Productr ca~e, note 12 belaw. 
bury Rubber Worker'.r case note I above, Jamieson J. noted that .. It Ia no doubt true 
in to several groups and that within each group the facta appUcable to indlviclual 
(at p. 55). 
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The second general point is that section 128 has little practical value when the employer 
is confronted by certain forms of rolling strike, even though one reason for the 1976 
amendment was the alleged difficulty posed by this fonn of industrial action; for present 
purposes the "rolling strike" may be described as "the action of a number of workers, 
acting in concert or pursuant to a common understanding, in striking in relay" (this being 
the definition supplied by section 119C subsection 3 of the Commerce Amendment Act 
19 76). For the purposes of section 128, "strike" must have the meaning given to that term 
under section 123 of the Industrial Relations Act. Under that section it has been held that 
if labour is withdrawn e.g. on certain days but not on others, there is a separate strike on 
any day or series of consecutiv~e days on which labour is withdrawn; however the workers 
involved are not to be regarded as on strike on the days when normal work is carried out.4 
The shorter the period of time involved in each separate "strike" withln the overall "rolling 
strike", the less effective action under section 128 will be since the only right conferred by 
that section is to suspend non-striking workers and such suspension "can only last until the 
end of the strike concerned at the time of the suspensions". 5 It might be said also that, 
dependent upon individual industrial circumstances, the shorter each "strike" within the 
relay the less likely it is that the supply of normal work will cease as a result of the action. 
Perhaps because of the inroads made by section 128 on established contractual prin-
ciple concerning suspension, the Arbitration Court has emphasised that "The employer 
who wishes to use the power to suspend must be careful to keep within the provisions of 
[the section] ".6 This view is echoed by the New Zealand Employers' Federation which has 
advised its members that section 128 should be used only where there is no other option 
and not ''as a strike-breaking exercise". (New Zealand Employers' Federation, 1979) Nor 
is it open to the employer who suspends workers to argue before the court in the alterna-
tive under section 128 and the common law if the employer has purported to act in exercise 
of power which is claimed to be derived from section 128. So in Whitehouse and others v 
The Ford Motor Company of New Zealand Limit,ed, where the employer "suspended" 
workers citing section 128 as justification but put forward an argument before the court 
based upon the common law right to suspend, Jamieson C.J. held that "The Court ... 
must look at the events which took place at the time. We are satisfied that ... the company 
... purported to act in exercise of the power which it claimed to derive from section 128. 
The matter must consequently be approached on that basis". 7 
Under subsection l of section 128 in order for suspension of non-striking workers to be 
valid it is necessary first that there be a strike, secondly that the inability to provide work 
that is normally performed bb' those workers arises as a fesult of the strike and, thirdly, 
that the suspension of employment lasts only so long as the strike exists. Each of these 
elements has caused difficulty. The first question is whether a strike exists; since section 
128 subsection 1 commences with the words "Where there is a strike" it follows that , 
before the employer can suspend non-striking workers, there must be a strike in existence 
at the time notices of suspension are given. In the Felt ex ~Carpets ( NZ) Ltd case notice of 
strike action was given by the Secretary of the 'Engine Drivers Union, to take effect on 
4 The phraseology is taken from the headnote to the judgment of Chilwell J. in Harder v New Zealand 
Tramways etc Employees JUW [1977] 2 NZLR 162; see especially pp. 167- 169. 
S Jamieson C.J. in New Zealand Engineering etc. IUW v New Zealand Steel Limited (1978) Arb. Ct. 
131 at p. 133. 
6 Jamieson C.J. in Wellington District Woollen Mills etc. IUW v Feltex Carpets (NZ) Limited (1978) 
Arb. Ct. 59. 
7 (1978) Arb. Ct. 287 at page 288. Compare the New Zealand Steel case not~e 5 above where the 
employer ma~e it c~ear _from the start tha~ the power. b~ing exercised was a ri~t to suspend ~t common 
law and the dJScusston ~ the Felte~ Carpets (NZ) Lzmued case, note 6 above, where it was unsuccess-
fully argued that a section 128 notice could amount to a 'constructive notice' that no work was avail-
able where a proper notice under the relevant award would have entitled the employer to suspend 
workers. 
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Friday 9 December 1978 and possibly the following Monday. Operation of the employers' 
dyehouse was dependent upon members of the Engine Driven Union working nomtally. 
On Thursday 8 December the employers issued notice of suspension to worken 
to take effect from 4.30 p.m. that day untU 8.00 a.m. on the following Tuesday. The 
Arbitration Court held that there was never a valid suspension since '•there was not, on the 
Thursday afternoon, a strike in existence".11 Similarly where an employer eig&t 
men for being parties to a strike and then purported to suspend under section 128 a further 
90 men for whom it was unable to provide work as a result, it was held that the supeaalona 
were invalid; when the non-striking workers were suspended the strike wu at an end since 
every one of the strikers had been dismissed.9 As previously stated the '~oiling strike" may 
well create problems for the employer here since the conunonly accepted analysis of 
form of industrial action is that, legally speaking, it consists of a series of indivldualsblkes; 
each one of these may begin and end in a short period and, under section 128, It is ~ble 
that suspensions may neither precede nor outlive each single .. strike" within the owraD 
framework of the stoppage. 
The remaining issue is the availability of normal work. In Whitehouse t111d othe11 v Tlte 
Ford Motor Company of New Zealand Limited a strike by boner attendants led to suspen-
sions throughout the respondents' Motor Vehicle Asse111bly Works. The three COIIIld-
ered by the court were brought by men who had "work in hand" when they were suspen-
ded. However the suspensions were carried out because, the employer argued, "if men were 
allowed to continue working they might, when the plant resumed work after the strike, be 
idle for a time until the work flow caught up with them". The Arbitration Court expressed 
the view that this argument was not available under section 128 since the question wu 
"whether, at the time of suspension, the employer was able or unable to provide work 
normally done by the worker .... Suspensions should be withheld untO. it is clear that It Ia 
no longer possible to provide the worker with normal work" .1 0 Jamieson CJ. pointed out 
that if there is a premature suspension "the Court cannot judge or even specullte as to how 
long the normal work could have been maintained". In similar circumstances aa ~t 
that prematurely suspended workers might be ordered to be paid ''up to the point at which 
... work listed would have run out as if they had been suspended at that point" waa reJec> 
ted by the Industrial Court on the basis that such premature suspensions were a nnDfty: 
suspensions "on a mass basis and not group by group as available work ran out" wu ct. 
cribed as "a course fraught with danger" .1 It may be that such premature are 
precipitated by an employer's realisation that what work remains woUld constitute lea 
than full-time employment. However it appears that, in order to amount to "work tNt Ia 
normally perfonned" under the section, the work available need not be such u to IIDOUilt 
to full-time employment. The leading case is the recent decision of the Court of peal In 
NZ Forest Products Limited v The Northem etc Woodpulp, Paper and Relllted Otarc 
IUW. 12 The case concerned a strike by maintenance unions at the Klnleith plant of New 
Zealand Forest Products. Certain workers, including an on compound attendant, fiere 
suspended although they had not participated in the strike. At the time the oil compouad 
attendant was suspended one of his duties (the periodic accounting of withdrawal t6 
supplies from the oil compound) could have been continued and there were alao 
operations .. which he may normally have been expected to do". Tbele fuoctloaa 
probably have been less than full-time employment for the worker. In the Arbitratloa 
8 Note 6 above at p. 61. 
9 Waitaki New Zealand R~frigeration Limit~d (Fin~gand Works) v The N~ ZMIImd M•t ~ 
etc IUW (1977) Ind. Ct. 149. 
I 0 Note 2 above, at p. 290. Emphasis added. 
II North Island Electrlet~l etc IUW v Corter 0/i Kokulllku Ptln Ptlcl/lc Ltd (1977} lad. Ct. H • 
12 Unreported, Court of Appeal, 27 May 1981 (C.A. 181/80) an ap- from t1ae 
tration Court in the North~m ~tc Woodpulp, Paper 11nd Relllted Pitiducnll/W y 
Products Llmit~d (unreported, Arbitration Court, Rotorua, 10 October 1980, A.C. t 
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Court, Hom C.J. held that the worker's suspension was "possibly premature and . . . 
should not have taken place for the whole time over whlch it occurred". The employer 
appealed. 
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under section 229 of the Act to dispose ofmatten "accordtna to the lubltantlalmefttltad 
equities of the case") where the matter has been refe11ed to tile dllpatel ft 
both parties.13 It is apparent, nonetheless, that the discretion wiD rarely be 
Therefore care must be exercised by appHcants bearing in mind the tiDll llmltl 
section 128, which have no counterpart under sections 117 and 116, Ia ._of 
the need for each individual worker's case to be considemd separately. 
In addition, in the New Zealtmd Forest Products case, the Court of held tile 
onus in appeals against suspension of non-striking worken lies on the 1111loa: theJe k ae 
on us on the enaployer to justify the suspension, although once evlclenee II to 
suggest that some normal work would be awilable durina the suapeaaion pedocl the Arbl· 
tration Court is "free to take the view that the eYidential onus had lhlfted to the 
and that in the absence of further evidence from the e111ployer the appe•llllould ascceed". 
It was noted though that the wide powen of the Arbitration Court to acladt aad Cl1l for 
evidence under section 57(1) of the Industrilll Rellltlons Act 1973 tlaat often 
questions of onus may not be of mudl importance under the Act". However, wiD 
need to come to the hearing with as much evidence u they can pther oa the eftbe 
availability of work that is nonnaDy perfonned at the time when the employw in'taked 
the section. It will not be enough simply to appeal and wait to 1ee what the 
employer may provide. 
FinaDy, whilst the court has wjde powers under section 128 to make a .._it 
thinks fit" and under section 4 7 to make a decision "in equity and good co 1 cieace• thil 
power must be exercised in a manner "not with the statute. it be the 
lndustrilll Relation~ Act or any other statute".15 Thus no remedy il awDable iftbl emplcJyer 
has confonned with the requirentents of the section;16 the most effectiw ~ of.,..., 
which unions can take under the law when confronted by of 
workers is to ensure that the enaployer hu done so. 
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